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Abstract:  
The Spanish labour market has one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe and 
the idea of making the labour market more flexible has become a key point in the 
political and economic debate. In the first part of this project I explain the different 
types of labour market flexibility and identify the main elements of the Danish labour 
market model (flexicurity model) comparing with the Spanish labour market. In the 
second part, I analyse the preferences and the perception of job security among Spanish 
and Danish people to identify the main individual characteristics that are related to 
those preferences. Finally, I conclude that despite the low employment protection 
regulation existing in Denmark, Danes feel more secure on their jobs due to the other 
elements that form the flexicurity model. These are the same elements that reduce the 
sensation of job security in Spain.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last years of economic crisis in Spain, it has been said that in order to stop 
the unemployment haemorrhage and to be able to create jobs again, it was strictly 
necessary to make the labour market flexible. Managers, CEOs (CEOs: chief executive 
officers) of large companies, entrepreneurs and some political parties have promoted 
flexibility. During the crisis, two labour reforms have been applied with this aim; the 
first one in 2010 when the socialist party (PSOE) was in the government and the second 
reform in 2012, with the popular party (PP) in the government. Nowadays, surrounded 
by an uncertain political situation, firms claim for a third labour market reform to 
introduce more flexibility to alleviate the unemployment problem of the Spanish 
economy. Recommendations from the European Union also advocate for a more 
flexible labour market. At the same time, the Unions demand the abolition of both 2010 
and 2012 labour market reforms1. 
In front of this situation where the interest of firms and unions are completely opposite, 
a relevant question is to analyse the preferences for flexibility and the perception of job 
security in Spain.  Since a reference point is needed, I compare those preferences and 
perceptions between Spain and Denmark. The reason is that the Danish labour market is 
one of the most efficient labour markets in Europe and it combines high levels of 
flexibility and security. The positive results of the flexicurity model have made the 
Danish labour market one of the most envied labour markets in Europe and over the 
world. This is why the European Union is promoting that the rest of European countries 
adopt the flexicurity model. 
The objective of this project is to analyse what means flexibility, how the Danish labour 
market works, what are its main characteristics, how people in Spain and Denmark feel 
in their labour markets and how different are the preferences and the feeling of job 
security in the citizens of these two countries.  
                                                          
1 Jansa, M. (2016). “Las empresas piden otra reforma laboral que permita más flexibilidad” El 
Periódico [Barcelona, Esp] SUNDAY, 8TH  MAY  2016: 
http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/economia/las-empresas-piden-otra-reforma-laboral-que-
permita-mas-flexibilidad-5112035. 
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My analysis of the preferences and feeling of job security  is based on Dolado, et al (2010). 
These authors compare the preferences of Spaniards and EU-15 citizens for flexibility in a 
descriptive way. They use the level of agreement on the statement “labour contracts should be 
more flexible to increase employment”, asked by the Eurobarometer May-June 2009. Dolado et 
al (2010) show how the proportion of people who agrees with that statement varies with 
individual characteristics and labour status. Unlike Dolado et al (2010), I analyse the 
preferences for flexibility and the feeling of job security using an econometric analysis. In this 
way I can estimate if an individual characteristic is related to those preferences after controlling 
for other variables. In addition,  while Dolado, et al (2010) compare the Spanish preferences 
with the EU-15 average, I make the comparison of the determinants of the preferences for 
flexibility in Spain with those in Denmark, which is the country that has applied the most 
successful combination of flexibility and security in the labour market.  
In order to answer the previous questions, in Section 1, I explain the concept of 
flexibility as well as the different kinds of labour flexibility existing, and whether they 
are substitutes or complements. In section 2 I deeply analyse the Danish flexicurity 
labour market in order to determinate which are the key variables that allow having high 
levels of flexibility and job security at the same time. The results found reveal that 
efficient active labour market policies (ALMP), generous unemployment benefits and 
low employment protection regulations are the key elements of the Danish flexicurity 
model. Finally in section 3 I analyse the preferences for job security in Denmark and 
Spain as well as the feeling of job security. The results reveal that despite the low 
employment protection regulations, in Denmark, people feel more secure in their jobs 
than in Spain, a country with a more restrictive regulation. At the same time, Spaniards 
have higher preferences for job security than Danes. Preferences for job security are 
really extended among every kind of people, no matters the age, gender, marital status, 
education level, labour situation and union membership in Spain. In Denmark, however, 
preferences for job security are higher in certain groups. 
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2 THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY 
2.1 What does Labour Market Flexibility mean? 
“Flexibility” in the labour market is generally used to describe the mechanism of 
adjustment used by firms to adapt their labour force to the hit of an outside shock. This 
mechanism allows firms to shape their organisation, wages and workforce in terms of 
number of employees and working hours. A flexible labour market is one where there 
are fewer regulations affecting the hiring or firing process and firms can easily shift 
wages and change the number of hours worked by their employees. A  labour market 
with low flexibility is swamped by laws and costs concerning the hiring or firing 
process, also it exist a huge difficulty for firms to adapt wages and working hours to the 
external shocks. 
The concept of Labour Market Flexibility (LMF) emerged in the early 80’s in both 
industrialized and some developing countries as a consequence of poor economic 
performance characterised by an standstill in production, high rates of unemployment 
and inflation. Since then, the idea that gained popularity at the level of policy makers, 
employers in general and in part of the academic establishment was that the way in 
which labour markets operated was a significant obstacle to economic growth (Lagos; 
1994). 
The main problem was the rigidity reflected in the price of the labour workforce, the 
conditions of employment and the quantity and quality of manpower. This rigidity is the 
result of institutional constraints, social policies, legislation, collective agreements, 
centralized negotiations, union performance and governmental guidelines. The Labour 
Market was seen not only as a problem but also as the solution. The solution was 
thought to make the Labour Market more flexible, adapt de requirements imposed by 
the technological change and the external competition.  
2.2 Labour Market Flexibility Classification 
When analysing the degree of flexibility in a labour market, two aspects need to be in 
mind. It exist different kinds of flexibility and there are plenty mechanisms to identify 
the level of flexibility. In the next pages, a classification of the different kinds of 
flexibility is made and the diverse methods to identify the level of flexibility are 
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exposed. This analysis is based on the classification made by the European Commission 
at (European Commission Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2006) 
2.2.1 External flexibility 
The external flexibility, also called numerical flexibility, refers to the ability of the firms 
to increase or decrease the number of employees depending on the variations on the 
demand and/or technical changes. It is hold that the expensive and complicated 
redundancies make firms to refrain themselves to bring in new employers because they 
will not be able to fire employees if economic conditions change. Lagos (1994) 
mentioned that the low unemployment rates saw in the United States are largely a 
consequence of American’s employers’ freedom to engage or dismiss workers as an 
answer to economic performance changes. 
This kind of adjustment is considered basic because firms need to stablish a stable 
correlation between the quantity of output supplied and the workforce needed to 
produce that output. If companies are not able to adjust the number of employees to 
their demand, profitability will decrease. So firms need to get adapted quickly to market 
fluctuations and changes in their environment to maintain their competitiveness and 
survive. Those economies with higher levels of external flexibility may suffer higher 
levels of unemployment during the recession periods, (Recio. A; 2007) 
In order to measure the level of external flexibility that a market has there are several 
ways. The average duration of the period of employment indicates how fast people 
change from one workplace to another, so, as the lower the average, the highest the 
level of flexibility. Firing costs are also a measure to determinate how flexible a labour 
market is; if those costs are low, firms will not hesitate to fire employees if needed. On 
the other hand, if firing has low cost, companies requiring more workers will hire new 
employees because it is known that they will not have to make a big effort to fire them 
if employees are not needed on the future.  
The kind of contract that predominates in a labour market also gives us some clues 
about the degree of flexibility of that market. Those markets that allow firms to hire 
people for a determinate period of time using a temporary contract are more flexible 
than those that do not. Temporary contracts enable firms to face punctual peaks of 
activity, stationary activities…; the possibility to engage employees to cover specific 
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tasks that need to be faced in certain hours or days  also allow to determinate the level 
of external flexibility. 
The standard indicator in figure 1 represents the average tenure in years with the same 
employer; the result can guide us to see how flexible a labour market is in the external 
side; the lower the average, the highest the job rotation, which indicates a higher degree 
of numerical flexibility.     
As appears in the figure, Denmark is the country with the lowest average tenure with the 
same employer in 2014. The high degree of external flexibility in Denmark is 
comparable to the British labour market. In contrast, the average tenure in Spain was 
33% higher than in Denmark in 2014. 
The difference between countries may be the result of a huge number of reasons as the 
industry structure or the temporality of the contracts. But it seems that the most likely 
explanation of the varying external flexibility is the ease with which employers can hire 
and fire employees. (Bredgaard, et al 2005). 
2.2.2 Internal flexibility 
The internal flexibility refers to the different adjustments that a firm can make in order 
to get adapted to changes in demand, changes in technology or external shocks. There is 
not only one way to modulate the firm adjusted to the economic performance. All kinds 
of internal flexibility depend on the regulation of the collective bargaining.  
Working time flexibility 
Also known as temporary flexibility refers to adjusting the number of hours worked and 
their placing. Increasing the flexible degree of working hours is a key point in the 
European employment strategy (Employment guideline N. 21). In order to respond 
quickly to sudden changes in demand, get adapted to new technologies and be in a 
position to innovate constantly with the aim to remain competitive, firms should 
become more flexible. This kind of flexibility not only keeps the firms alive and 
competitive but also aids employees to suit their private lives and reconcile work and 
family life. 
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The flexibility of working time is considered as a possible alternative to wage or 
employment adjustment when firms are facing changing economic conditions. 
“Reduction of working hours has been the form of flexibility which has had the greater 
acceptance” (Lagos 1994, p. 88). This flexibility is a win-win trade and unions accept 
the working hour’s adjustment to fight against unemployment. On the other hand, 
employers are interested in expanding the working time to use as much as possible the 
working capacity of their machines thus they could create shifts. 
The percentage of part-time contracts gives us an idea of how flexible in terms of 
working hours a labour market is. If part-time contracts have an important weight 
means that the labour market is rather flexible. As figure 2 shows, The Netherlands is 
the country with the highest percentage of part-time contracts, almost 50%. Countries 
where the partial time has a bigger importance is around 25%, Denmark and the UK are 
among them as well as Germany and Austria. These countries have a more flexible 
labour market than those that are around 10%.  Spain is among the countries with lower 
levels of part-time contracts. It is remarkable that in almost all countries the importance 
of partial-time jobs has increased over the years, which means that the European labour 
market is becoming more working time flexible as time goes by. Concerning the 
working hours, if all employees work the same hours per week means that there is no 
flexibility; however, if every employee works a different number of hours means that 
there is a high level of flexibility on that market. 
Working hours in Western countries as they are today have been shaped to 40-hour 
weeks that gained prominence over the 20th century. The 40-hour week has remained in 
many countries within Europe. At the same time, countries show wide differences in the 
actual distribution of working hours. Figure 3 illustrates the actual variety of working 
hours in Europe, comparing the working time in 2004 for males and females in 4 
European countries; Hungary, United Kingdom, Denmark and France. While in 
Hungary the prevalence of the 40-hour week is demonstrated, 80% of all employees 
usually work 40 hours per week. In the UK seems that the concept of standard working 
time has disappeared in this country. The rest of the European countries are somewhere 
between these two countries. It is easy to identify a peak or two of worked hours and 
generally coincide with the standard working hours of their countries. In France, the 
standard working time is 35 hours per week and many employees work among 31 and 
35 hours. Denmark also deviates from the 40hour-week and most employees work 37 
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hours per week. In terms of flexibility, the smoothest the shape is, the higher degree of 
flexibility existing in the labour market. Countries where the working hours are more 
flexible allow firms to adapt their employees’ working time to afford changes on 
external factors.  
Functional flexibility 
An alternative measure of adjustment is the internal mobility of employees inside the 
firm, getting adapted to its necessities. A flexible workforce can help to keep a stable 
employment if they change their workplace (Recio, 2007) This calls workers to be 
multitasking and be able to adapt to different tasks which involves different levels of 
complexity. However, this kind of mobility or flexibility does not depend exclusively 
on the capacity or availability of the workforce to change their workplace; it is also 
related with the versatility, mobility of the means of production, organizational capacity 
of the firm. 
The functional flexibility brings up the ability of companies to use efficiently all their 
workforce when there is a variation on the demand, the work performance and the new 
opportunities offered by new technologies. 
If any of both, flexibility of workforce and firm’s capacity, is too rigid, there is no place 
for functional flexibility. However, a firm which has the capacity to transfer employees 
from one part to another is likely to be adapted to changes that can affect their demand.  
Functional flexibility is preferred by workers rather than the wage or employment 
flexibility since it is not based on decreasing the wages, unemployment. This kind of 
flexibility allows them to use their know-how, they get more involved in all the 
production process and they feel involved in the management of the enterprise by 
playing an active role. So it involves employees having a better opinion of their work 
conditions and allows the company to restructure the production process and get 
adapted to the new market conditions. The functional flexibility forces firms to invest 
and form their employees in different tasks. This is the reason why training programmes 
are becoming highly popular in the relationship between employers and employees. 
Wage flexibility 
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It is the degree of responsiveness of nominal wages to changes in the economic 
conditions such as inflation and productivity. A higher level of wage flexibility means 
that firms can adapt their wage costs to the economic performance in order to maintain 
their effectiveness and keeping their workforce. At the same time, if salaries are flexible 
enough, they can be used as a motivational tool in order to raise productivity. Wage 
flexibility has a dark side; wage moderation can have an effect on the internal demand. 
If real wages decrease, the national consumption will decrease and can affect negatively 
to employment. Also, a decrease on salaries can promote social tensions.  
When external shocks occur and adjustment must be done, it can be done either by 
reducing prices or by quantity (employment). Garicano (2010) shows that while during 
the economic crisis, in UK, the adjustment was made in wages rather than in 
employment, in Spain was completely the opposite. 
Garicano (2010), a high degree of flexibility in terms of wages allows firms to keep 
their level of profitability avoiding firing part of their workforce and be capable to stay 
alive when the demand is low. The flexibility of wages depends on the regulation of the 
collective bargaining. If unions are strong and powerful, wages are less likely to be 
flexible and wages could be maintained. So firms cannot use the internal flexibility and 
they use the external one (especially temporary contracts if firing permanent workers is 
too expensive because of high firing costs) to adjust their workforce. 
In order to see how flexible wages are in Spain and in other European countries, figure 
4 represents the annual variation of wages. There is not a clear evolution for all the 
countries, each country seems to follow its own path due to the fact that wage evolution 
depends on the collective bargaining. However, both the United Kingdom and Spain 
seems to have a more marked evolution, with a higher level of volatility. Is in the UK 
where the salaries started to decrease first. Meanwhile, in France, Germany and 
Denmark salaries increased around 2% but in Spain salaries raised the most despite the 
crisis, they did it more than 6%. The results show up that is the British labour market 
the one with the highest wage flexibility, since it was capable to adapt wages to the 
economic situation. 
2.3 Labour Flexibilities are Substitutes or Complements? 
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It has been exposed the different kinds of flexibility. According to Eichhrost et al (2009) 
Spain had one of the worst flexibility degrees in the labour market in Europe before the 
crisis. Figure 52 shows countries ranked by numerical, functional and wage flexibility. 
As longer the bar is the higher degree of flexibility. Countries with higher level of these 
kinds of flexibility are Anglo-Saxon countries with the USA leasing the ranking. USA, 
Canada, New Zealand, Ireland and the UK are among the top 10. This result is mainly 
due to their high level of numerical and wage flexibility while functional flexibility is 
on the average. Denmark, however, is also among the top 10 but its flexibility degree is 
characterized by a higher weight of functional flexibility. The Danish performance is 
better than any other Continental European and Scandinavian countries. Most European 
countries are on the bottom of the ranking which means that these countries have a more 
protective or rigid institutions in the numerical, functional and wage flexibility. 
The Figure 62 includes all kinds of flexibility. The labour markets which are more 
flexible are the Scandinavian ones and the Anglo-Saxon. Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
are the countries where the internal flexibility has a bigger weight. The figure reveals a 
weakness degree of flexibility in the Mediterranean countries. “They combine weak 
internal flexibility with rather rigid institutions in the external labour market and in 
wage setting” (Eichhrst, et al 2009 p-18).  
As it is shown in figure 6 those countries with high levels of external and wage 
flexibility also have a high degree of internal flexibility, which means that the different 
kinds of flexibility are complements rather than substitutes (Felgueroso 2010). 
  
                                                          
2
 Figures 5 and 6 use a different classification of labour flexibility. The external numerical, internal 
numerical and internal functional are the same as in the classification above, however, Eichhrst, et al 2009 
consider wage flexibility neither internal nor external and the external functional flexibility represents the 
Active Labour Market policies expenditure, education attainment and expenditure per student. External 
functional flexibility was not considered as flexibility in the previous classification. 
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3 THE DANISH LABOUR MARKET 
3.1 The Danish Labour Market and Economic Performance 
The Danish economy is characterised, in recent years, by a high growth: between 2003 
and 2007, the Danish economy annual growth rate was 2.02%. When the crisis arrived, 
the growth turned upside-down, the Gross Domestic Product growth rate was around -
0.796% between 2008 and 2011. The Danish economy has a moderate behaviour since 
2011 growing a 0.06% each year as an average. The figure 7 shows the annual GDP 
growth rate between 2003 and 2014 in Denmark and Spain. It is remarkable that since 
2010 the Danish GDP growth rate is higher than the Spanish one. 
Table 1 shows some key facts about Danish labour market. The data is from 2015Q4 
and it is included a comparison with the Spanish labour market. 
  Denmark Spain 
Total population 5.7 million 47 million 
Active people rate 78.5% 74.2% 
Employment rate 73.8% 58.6% 
Unemployment rate 5.9% 21% 
Youth employment rate 55.5% 17.9% 
Youth unemployment rate 10.2% 46.2% 
Source: Eurostat 
The Danish unemployment rate is one of the lowest in the European Union. From a 
peak of 12.4% in 1993, the rate has declined to 2.4% of the workforce in 2007. When 
the crisis started, the unemployment rate reached the 7.6% in 2011 but it has dropped 
till 6.3%.   
From 1997 down to 2007 the Danish labour market is characterized not only by a 
reduction in unemployment but also by an increase in employment.  From 1995 to 2006 
the employment rate rose from 73.8% to 77.4% and the unemployment rate has dropped 
off from 7% in 1995 to 3.5% 22 years later.  However, since the economic crisis began, 
the employment rate fell till 72.5% in 2013 and the unemployment rate rose to 7.6% in 
2011. Despite the crisis, these labour market indicators have always been in a better 
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position than the average of the EU. The Danish employment rate has been always 7.9 
points above the EU rate. One reason for this high employment rate is the fact that 
70.4% of women and 76.6% of men were working in 2015 (Eurostat). This result is a 
direct consequence of a change that started in 1960’s, when more women started to 
enter in the labour market and an extensive child care system started to be stablished. 
(Sørensen 2006). Figures 8 and 9 represent the annual employment and unemployment 
rates for Denmark, Spain, EU 15 Countries and EU 27 Countries. It is remarkable that 
despite the fact that in Denmark the GDP had a sharped decrease than Spain, the 
unemployment rate was higher in Spain than in Denmark, this reveals that there was 
only external flexibility for temporal contracts. 
3.2 Flexicurity: the Danish Model 
Even if the concept of flexicurity is quite young, it has become a key objective of the 
European Employment Strategy (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). The concept of flexicurity 
is based on the idea that flexibility and security are supportive elements (EC, 2006). 
This concept is still developing and it exist two main definitions for flexicurity: The 
Wilthagen3’s definition of flexibility-security and the Danish labour market. 
It exist an international consensus that the success of the labour market in Denmark is 
the direct result of a high labour market dynamism combined with a high degree of 
social protection.(Hendeliowitz, 2008) This successful model has been called in the 
recent years the “flexicurity model” referring to the combination of flexibility and 
security.  
The flexicurity model is based on a climate of understanding and cooperation between 
the employer and the employee. These values are not always easy to achieve, that is the 
reason to believe that the public intervention is indispensable to ensure the adaptability 
and understanding among both, which is essential to ensure the well-functioning 
process of the labour market (Hendeliowitz, 2008). Both, employers and employees, 
have their own interests or aims; generally employers and firms look for high levels of 
flexibility which could enable them to afford better the possible demand shocks 
However, employees prefer lofty levels of security in terms of employment. Generally, 
                                                          
3
 Flexicurity is seeing as a policy strategy with the aim to evaluate and value the labour 
market strategies and policies as an empirical matter (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004) using 
flexicurity as a tool to compare national labour markets systems. (EC, 2006)  
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both aims are viewed as opposed, but not in the Danish model since flexibility of firms 
and security of employees are being mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting with 
each other. The rapport among employer and employee beneficiates the creation of an 
environment that incentives the creation of new job places when, mine while, more 
opportunities to grow up, get adapted and take advantage of new opportunities are 
offered (Hendeliowitz, 2008). 
As figure 10 shows, the Danish flexicurity system can be represented as a triangle. 
Three sides and three vertexes where each side represents one flow of people and where 
each vertex means one possible situation. 
Two arrows link the numerical external flexibility and the generous unemployment 
benefits, these arrows reflect those workers who are dismissed and those who are hired. 
Those who are unemployed are assisted by active labour market policies and find 
another one quite easily and quickly. Training programs are given in order to facilitate 
the re-entrance on the labour market. Also, the active labour market policies have the 
aim to create incentives and motivate people to get back to the labour market despite the 
attraction of being unemployed caused by the high level of generosity of the 
unemployment compensations. 
3.3.1 Labour Market Policies  
The first vertex is a high spending on the Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). 
Authors as Eichhrost et al (2009) consider it as external functional flexibility.  Training, 
good public employment services to help the unemployed to find a job… Unemployed 
people are offered the chance to participate in courses that would encourage them to get 
new skills to be able to find new jobs. At the same time, incentives to be back to the 
labour market are being created. The fact of receiving training updates the skills of 
unemployed people, their employment chances are increased and the salary that they 
could earn in the labour market is higher than the unemployment benefit that they 
perceive (Kvist & Pedersen, 2007) 
In Denmark, the active labour market policies enjoy a political and popular support. In 
the different political parties, there is a broad political compromise over the reform of 
social and labour market policies. Social partners which are trade unions, employer’s 
organisations and the State have a wide role in the planning, implementation and start-
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up of the activation policies. Three quarts of the participants are satisfied with their 
offer of activation, and the population at large support these labour market policies. 
(Kvist & Pedersen, 2007) ALMPs policies have a dual role, the aims of this policies are 
not only ensure that everyone who work does it but also upgrading the skills of the 
unemployed to face the labour market demand and take advantage of this situation to 
get better jobs in the future (Hendeliowitz, 2008). The activation policies are an 
incentive to encourage people to be back to the labour market. However, the idea of 
lowering the unemployment benefits is seen as undesirable (Kvist & Pedersen, 2007). 
Figure 11 represents the total expenditure on ALMP and Passive Labour Market 
Policies (PLMP) as a percentage of the GDP in some Europeans countries as well as the 
EU-28 and EU-15 average in 2010. Denmark expends 1.82% of its GDP on ALMP, 
being the European country with higher levels of expenditure on this kind of policy. In 
the ranking, Denmark is followed by Netherlands, France, Sweden and Finland. On the 
other part of the ranking Greece, Italy and the UK are at the bottom. Spain expends 
0.83% of its GDP on ALMP. Concerning PLMP, Spain is the country which expends 
the biggest amount on PLMP, 3.05% of the GDP, followed by Ireland and the 
Netherlands. Norway and the UK are the countries which expend less of their GDP on 
this kind of labour policies. This data could be affected by the unemployment rate, it 
could be expected that if a country has high rates of unemployment, the expenditure on 
Passive labour market policies would be increased. To eliminate this effect, figure 12 
represents the expenditure on € for each unemployed citizen. The results show big 
differences between the countries analysed. Counting both ALPM and PLMP, 
Luxemburg is the country that expends the most per unemployed, 43.746€, followed by 
the Netherlands with 41.649€. Those countries that expend the less in both Active and 
Passive labour market policies on trying to reactivate their jobless citizens are the UK 
that expenses 5.092€ and Greece with 3.346€. In general a higher expenditure on labour 
market policies is due to PLMP except in countries as Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
the UK. A higher budget for PLMP faces the flexicurity model where the ALMP have 
an important role on the activation polices.     
3.3.2 The unemployment benefit system 
The second vertex refers to the generous unemployment benefits; that is, the amount of 
money payed to the dismissed employee. High unemployment benefits give security in 
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case of unemployment. This security provides time enough to search for a new and 
proper job. 
The country that expends the most as a percentage of the GDP on labour market policies 
is Spain followed by Ireland and Denmark by 0.198 and 0.316 percentage points. As it 
has been already mentioned, the vast majority of the European countries expend more of 
their budget on passive labour market policies; all EU-15 countries except Denmark, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom do so. Despite the fact that Spain is the one who 
spends the most as a percentage of the GDP in PLMP, it does not mean that the Spanish 
system is highly generous with unemployed people. Concerning the spending by 
unemployed person, Spain is under the EU-15 average. The Spanish government 
expended for each unemployed, 7.025€ while in Denmark the amount was 15.318€ in 
2010. The fact that Denmark is the fourth EU-15 country the highest budget per 
unemployed concerning passive labour market polices is highly related with the 
generosity of the unemployment benefits.  
The unemployment benefit system is the security key of the Danish flexicurity model. 
The perception of security that Danish employees have is a consequence of the huge and 
wide welfare schemes. The unemployment benefit system consists of two parts, the 
unemployment insurance (UI) which is complemented by a basic state-financed social 
security benefit system. This security provided by the State is a key factor for trade 
union to accept the flexibility and the ease with which Danish employees can be 
dismissed (Hendeliowitz, 2008). 
In Denmark, the unemployment insurance is voluntary. There are 26 unemployment 
insurance funds (arbejdsløshedskasserne) divided into occupational sectors, but 
originally were allied to the trade unions. In order to receive the UI Danish employees 
must join an UI fund. 
An employee can only be in the right to receive unemployment benefits, normally, after 
one year of membership of a recognised unemployment fund. Moreover, the worker 
must work 1,924 hours to apply for the unemployment benefit for the first time. This is 
equivalent to the standard full-time working hours for the occupation for at least one 
year in the last three years. 
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The amount of money that unemployed people receive is the 90% of previous income 
from employment, up to a maximum of DKK 801 (€ 101) per day five days a week 
from the first day of unemployment, up to a maximum of four year, including activation 
periods (OECD, 2013). 
The benefits of the Danish UI are barely highly to those in other countries. As table 2 
shows, no other country is as generous as Denmark in the payment rate as a percentage 
of the earning base. Contrary to other countries as Spain, Sweden or Belgium, the 
amount of money payed as UI is not degraded which means that a Danish unemployed 
citizen earns the same the first day of unemployment and the last. As Kvist and 
Pedersen (2007, p 102) said “the social protection system offers benefits that, by 
international standards, are generous with regard to the length of benefit periods and the 
levels of benefits for low-income groups”. 
The no degradation of the UI and the generous benefits create two problems. First, high 
levels of benefits mean that companies might pay higher salaries to attract workers, so 
the reservation wage is higher. Secondly, the benefits may twist incentives to work. 
However this problem is faced in Denmark by firstly, education, job training and active 
labour market policies which aim to improve the skills of unemployed and make easier 
their reincorporation to the labour market. Secondly, the different measures which aim 
to avoid misuse of those benefits and ensure that the unemployed who receives benefits 
is available to work (Kvist & Pedersen, 2007). In order to control the job searching 
process of unemployed people, the activations programs are a workfare. The 
participation on activation programs is a precondition for being eligible for 
unemployment benefits or social assistance. At the same time, the participation in those 
programs makes the job searching more active, motivates the unemployed to job 
creation and lows the reserve demands for the type of jobs (job tasks, location, 
employer etc.) they are willing to accept (Andersen & Svarer, 2007) 
3.3.3 Flexible Labour Market 
The third vertex of the triangle refers to the flexible rules concerning the hiring and 
dismissal employees’ process so to the external flexibility. 
It exist a high degree of mobility in Danish the labour market (Hendeliowitz, 2008). 
This characteristic is not seen as weak point of the model, quite the opposite. In 2014 
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the average job duration in Denmark was 8.1 years, the lowest duration in the EU-15, as 
the figure 13 shows. The average was 7.4 years in 2008 (Source: OECD). Denmark is 
also located among the lowest job duration’s average in the OECD. An important fact is 
that mobility exist in all levels of employment, both high and low status job. No matter 
which is the type of employee, industry sector or firm size, overall the level of mobility 
is high in the Danish labour market. Even if the numerical flexibility is high, the highest 
rate is among employees in small companies and in the younger ages.  
Another key element of the flexibility of the labour market is the employment 
protection. In 2004 the OECD said that restrictive employment protection reduces flow 
into and out employment, even if employment protection protects the existing jobs and 
prevent job loss, they also restrict job creation. The limited of employment protection in 
Denmark is one of the indicators that show a high level of job mobility. As figure 14 
demonstrates, in Denmark, employment protection policies are not very extended, 
which makes easier to firms to adapt their workforce to market shocks.  
This means that job security in Denmark is quite low. But, do Danes feel secure on their 
job place? Do the lax employment protection policies have an impact on the perception 
of job security? Do Danes have preferences for job security? 
One of the possible explanations for high or low levels of security feeling is the most 
common type of contract. If the labour contract is temporal the insecurity is expected to 
be higher. At the end of the period the uncertainty of what will happen decreases the 
security of feeling. The rate of temporary/fixed-term workers took in 2015 the highest 
value in Spain among EU-15 countries, 25,2% while in Denmark is the second lowest 
ratio (8.7%). The average ratio for EU-15 is 14,1 % and 14,2% for EU-27 (Eurostat). 
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4 PREFERENCES FOR JOB SECURITY IN DENMARK AND SPAIN  
What do Spanish and Danish people think about job security? Are preferences for job 
security related to individual characteristics such as age, education level, union 
membership, labour status? The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), is a 
huge survey carried out every year in 45 countries with a social-economic aim. From 
1989, the ISSP publishes every 8 years a specific module called “Work Orientation”. 
This module gathers information of citizens from 33 countries about a wide range of 
matters concerning their individual labour status. Respondents are older than 18 except 
in Finland where they are above the age of 15 and in Japan and South Africa where they 
are older than 16. 
In this project the database used will be the last one available, which is from 2005, that 
means that it was made before the crisis. The countries selected for this project are 
Denmark and Spain, so the analysis will be based on these two countries. The main 
reason to choose Denmark as a comparative country is that, as shown in previous 
sections, the Danish labour market is one of the most dynamics labour markets and the 
referent to flexicurity. 
Among all the questions asked in the ISSP survey, a certain number of questions have 
been chosen for this project. The survey offered a range of possible answers for each 
question, but in order to make the data analysis simplest, some different answers have 
been grouped together following a certain criteria. Table 3 shows the questions that 
were asked, the options given to the respondent and the aggrupation made for this 
project. The answer “not applicable” is treated as missing. 
The chosen questions can be separated in two groups. The first one has the proposal to 
determinate the profile of the survey respondent: Age, sex, marital situation, labour 
status, educational degree and membership to union trade. The second group defines the 
preferences for job security and the perception of job security for those who have a job. 
The variable V11 refers to the preferences for job security, people had to qualify the 
level of importance that having job security means for them. In the V29 question, 
survey respondents were asked about how secure they feel on their job place by 
agreeing with the sentence “my job is secure”. 
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In the first block, the criterion to group the categories of a question is based in two 
aspects: the closeness to other possible answers and the sample’s significance. In many 
occasions one possible answer was chosen by few people. In order to avoid this 
situation, some answers have been grouped. Also, in the original survey it exist two 
different answers for the same question where there was a tinny difference between two 
options and this small variation was not relevant for this project so the two answers 
have been grouped. 
 
The dependent variables are assembled using the criteria of answers’ closeness. The 
answers for these questions evaluated the degree of preference for a certain aspect. The 
answers took a value from 1 to 5 from less to more preferences. In these cases, those 
people whose answer was very important or important were assembled and those who 
answered not important or not important at all form another group. 
The table 4 summarizes the sample used. Even if Spain has bigger population, the 
proportion of Danes asked is higher. 
With this sample, the differences between the Danish and the Spanish labour situation 
are visible. The percentage of unemployed and inactive people in Spain is quite higher 
than in Denmark. While in Denmark, the unemployed respondents are 2.25%, in Spain 
they are 8.56% and the inactive respondents’ rate in Spain is almost twice the Danish 
rate. What is remarkable is the difference on the education level of the survey 
respondents depending on the country. While in Spain 77.64% of the respondents have 
a low level, in Denmark is only the 12.64% and the majority has a medium level of 
education. In Denmark, the percentage of people who have a high level of education is 
almost twice the percentage in Spain.  
The main goal of using this data is trying to stablish a relation between the variables 
previously mentioned and the preferences for job security. Since we are analysing the 
Spanish and the Danish survey, also, we will be able to determinate if the preferences 
are similar or not between the citizens of these two European countries. But, before 
going deeper into the data analysis, I present a descriptive analysis of the sample. 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
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In the following section an analysis concerning the data obtained will be performed. The 
main purpose is to identify the core features of a person who prefers her job to be secure 
(variable V11). The characterization made will be contrasted, later on, using 
econometric tools. 
Figure 1 reveals that Spaniards prefer job security to a higher extent than Danish. The 
96.7% of all Spanish interviewed declared that for them job security is either very 
important or important in a job. In contrast to the Danish where these options only reach 
78.91%. This difference is higher only if the answer very important is considered; 
69.5% in Spain and 31.94% in Denmark. 
Regarding the age, preferences for job security have a different path depending on the 
country. As figure 15 illustrates in Denmark, 39.05% of interviewed people between 55 
and 64 years consider job security as very important in a job, in contrast to the 24.81% 
of people between 25 and 34 years old who are into job security. In Spain, however, 
younger people are the ones preferring job security rather than older people. 73.51% of 
those between 18 and 24 years old say that job security is very important in a job; on the 
other side, 69.13% between 55 and 64 years old show strong preferences for job 
security. 
Concerning the gender of the survey respondent, women are the ones who prefer a 
higher level of job security. In Denmark the differences between men and women are 
wider than in Spain. 34.88% of Danish women consider job security as very important 
in a job in front of the 28.63% of men. In both, women and men case, the preferences 
line is U-shaped. The minimum rate of preferences for job security is found in the 25-34 
age group; 19.82% for men and 28.57% for women. The percentage of women who 
choose very important in Spain is lower than the percentage of men; 68.78% against 
69.95%. Nevertheless, if the answers very important and important are considered, 
women (97.72%) prefer job security rather than men (97.24%). Concerning the 
women’s answers, the distribution has a clear decreasing tendency. As younger a 
woman is, higher her preferences for job security are. In the men case, it seems that 
there is no clear trend. 
The effects of the level of education have a different effect depending on the country. In 
Denmark, both men and women prefer job security when the education degree is low. It 
clearly exist a decreasing relation between the education level and the inclination for job 
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security. The results obtained, illustrated in figure 16, indicates that people with higher 
levels of education have less preferences for job security rather than people with lower 
levels. The reason to this fact could be that people with higher levels of education, in a 
regular basis, have jobs that are required of a higher amount of human capital feel 
themselves more secured in their jobs, as other elements are more relevant than security. 
On the other hand, those who have less education levels, feel themselves threatened so 
they tend to care more about security.  86.56% of the Danish respondent who have a 
low degree of education claim that job security is very important or important in a job. 
However, only 68.49% of those with a higher level of education chose the same answer. 
In Spain, the outlook is partially distinct. A clear correlation cannot be stablished. 
People with low or medium education level show a similar tendency for job security, 
around 97.5% of them selected very important or important. But when analysing the 
high-education group, differences between men and women appear. While highly 
qualified men are more into job security (98.33%), women are around 94%.  
Regarding marital status, divorced citizen have less preferences for job security than 
married people. This fact could be explained by the fact that married would need more 
job security to balance job and personal life, so a higher level of job security is required. 
33.44% of married Danish people said that job security is very important, while 28.28% 
of single people considered it. The same picture is found in Spain, 69.51% of married 
people chose very important, while that option was selected by 66.07% of divorced 
people. 
Concerning the labour status, the analysis obtained in Denmark and in Spain is 
completely different. Figure 17 and 18 show the preferences for job security depending 
on the labour situation and if the answers have been aggregated or not. The majority of 
inactive citizens in Denmark believe that job security is very important or important in a 
job place. Nevertheless, full-time workers present less inclination for job security. 
These results show up that people who are either inactive or unemployed think that 
security is important because with higher levels of security they might not be 
unemployed or they might be back to the labour market. In Spain, however, employed 
people display more preference for job security. At the same time, if the answers very 
important and important are grouped, inactive people lead the classification. These 
results guide us to believe that for inactive or unemployed people a higher level of job 
security on the labour market do not mean lower possibilities to lose their job.  
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The union membership is a feature that seems to have a relation with the preferences for 
job security, at least in Denmark.  In that country, union and ex-union members have a 
stronger tendency for job security rather than people who never was part of a union. 
Figure 19 represents the percentage of respondents divided by their preferences for job 
security and their relationship with unions. Union member lead the ranking for job 
security. Since in Denmark unions have an active role in their flexicurity model, union 
member clearly stand up for job security. On the other side, in Spain, it seems that no 
relation exists. As in Denmark, union member have a higher conviction that job security 
is rather important or very important in a job place. But, ex-union members do not stand 
job security as people that have never been in a union. This also may be explained by 
the low rate of trade union density in Spain, 16.9% in 2013, while in Denmark, that rate 
was 66.8%. 
The last variable analysed is the perception that working people have of security on 
their job. In Denmark, when people feel more secure on their job place, they have 
higher preferences for job security rather than when job security in not perceived. Table 
5 and figure 20 show the positive relation between job security preferences and 
perceptions. In Spain, the same patterns are followed but not as sharped as in Denmark. 
When only the answer very important is taken into account, a U-Shaped tendency 
appears, however, when both very important and important are analysed, looks an 
increasing preference as it happens in Denmark. 
To sum up, preferences for job security are quite different between the two analysed 
countries. In Spain exist a general tendency for job security; while in Denmark, features 
of those who stand job security are more noticeable. As it has been mentioned, labour 
security is preferred in Spain rather than in Denmark. During all the previous analysis, 
the percentage of people how are into job security was higher in Spain. The higher level 
of support from all kind of people makes the task of creating a profile of a Spaniard who 
stands job security practically impossible.  
In Denmark, however, even if popularity of job security is lower than in Spain, the 
features of those who stand job security are more marked. Labour job security is 
preferred by women between 55 and 64 years old, with a low education level, married 
rather than single people, inactive or unemployed and union members. 
4.2 Econometric Analysis 
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In this section, I conduct an econometric analysis in order to determine which of the 
previous features are really significant and which is the direction of the relation. I make 
the analysis separately for Spain and Denmark. 
I consider two different explained variables, V11 (preferences for job security) and V29 
(perception of security in their job place). Both variables are related to the same set of 
explanatory variables. Almost all of the explanatory variables selected are dummy 
variables. To simplify the analysis the dependent variable, V11 or V29, are considered 
as a continuous variable. Also, to be more precise, the variables which show preferences 
and perception for job security will not be aggregated, which means that the variable 
used will be the direct answers given by the respondents. For this econometric analysis, 
5 categories are considered for the estimation for both dependent variables. For variable 
V11, 1 corresponds to considering job security not important at all, 2 means not 
important, 3 is indifferent, 4 corresponds to important and 5 represents very important. 
For variable V29, respondents were asked to indicate the agreement degree with the 
sentence: “My job is secure”. The possible answers are as follows: 1 corresponds to 
strongly disagree, 2 is disagree, 3 means neither agree nor disagree, 4 corresponds to 
agree and 5 represents strongly agree 
The econometric analysis is based on the estimation of the following econometric 
specification:  
Model 1 and 2, estimation of V11 variable 
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Model 3 and 4, estimation of V29 variable 
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The method to estimate the regression is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Since V29 
was only answered by people who were employed, the variables that capture the 
sensation of job security in function of the employment status are reduced to part time 
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and full time jobs. In this case, the dummy variable for part-time job is considered the 
reference variable. The reference variables for the dummy variables are the followings: 
FEMALE, MARRIED, DEGREE MEDIUM, UNEMPLOYED and Once union 
member. 
4.3 Results 
The main objective of this econometric model is to verify if the patterns previously 
observed in the descriptive analysis are supported by the econometric analysis. Despite 
the fact that the significance level, in some variables, is not too high, the sign of the 
coefficient is helpful to determinate the main features of those who prefer job security in 
Spain and Denmark. At the same time, I’ll try to make a relation between the 
preferences for job security and the characteristics of the labour market in each country. 
Table 6 and table 7 represent the results from the estimation of model 1 and 2. The first 
characteristic to be analysed is the age. In both countries, Denmark and Spain, the 
coefficient of age has a negative sign. However, in Denmark, the AGE2 has a positive 
effect on the job security preferences which means that as it can be seen on figure 21, as 
people get older, their preferences for job security are higher. On the other side, in 
Spain, the figure 22 reveals that no relation can be established between the age of the 
respondent and the preferences for job security.  
The variable sex takes a value 1 when the survey respondent is a man and 0 when it is a 
woman. The results obtained for Denmark verify the hypothesis that women prefer job 
security rather than men and the relationship is significant at 1% level. In Spain, it can 
be said that both genders prefer job security equally. Concerning the education level, in 
both countries, people with university studies have lower preferences for job security. It 
is remarkable that in Denmark, the coefficient for high education is significant at 1% 
level. It can be said that a highest level of education is related with lower levels of 
preferences for job security. Even if the effect of the labour situation is not significant 
for any country, thanks to the econometric regression, it is visible that unemployed 
people are those who prefer job security since the other labour situation groups have a 
negative coefficient; following the unemployed, the next who prefer job security are 
inactive, followed by full-time employees and finally those with part-time jobs. 
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A feature that is significant at least at 10% level in both countries is the union 
membership. In Denmark, but also in Spain, people who are part of a union show higher 
preferences for job security. Nevertheless, the difference comes when analysing those 
who never were members of a union. In Denmark, these people have lower preferences 
for job security, but in Spain, they have higher preferences rather than those who once 
were members of a union. These results could be explained by the fact than in Spain 
unions have lower rates of membership. Anyway, when analysing how secure 
respondents feel on their job place, more light will shed on the relation between job 
security preferences and union membership. 
Table 8 and table 9 represent the results from the estimation of model 3 and 4. In 
contrast to the preferences for job security, the age is a significant variable to 
determinate the sensation of job security in both countries. However, the path of the job 
security sensation in not same in Denmark than in Spain. The econometric output 
reveals a different sign for the coefficients, while in Denmark the age’s coefficient is 
negative and the squared age coefficient has a positive sign, in Spain, is on the other 
way. Figures 23 and 24 show the relation between the age and the sensation of security 
in a job in Denmark and in Spain. The results reveal a U-shaped relation in Denmark 
and an inversed-U-shaped in Spain. The path of the sensation of security in a job place 
can be related with the labour market structure. In Spain the high levels of employment 
protection lead to an increasing perception of job security when you get older, but in 
contrast, in the earlier moments of the labour life, the perception of security is lower. 
Also the high cost of dismissal, compared with those in Denmark, (OECD, 2013) 
favours that Spanish young people have lower sensation of job security. What is 
remarkable is that despite the fact that Denmark has a more lax employment protection 
regulation, it does not affect to the perception of job security. The V29 variable average 
for Denmark is 3.95 against 3.72, which means that generally, Danish people feel more 
secure than Spanish people. This result can be related with the high importance of the 
temporary contracts in Spain, especially among young people. Figure 25 represents the 
temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees, by sex and age in 
2005. The rate for every combination of age and sex, the rate in Spain is at least twice 
bigger than in Denmark, the highest difference is within males between 24 and 49 years, 
in Denmark the 5.5% have a temporary contract, while in Spain the ratio is 5,58 time 
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higher and represents the 30,7%. As it was been mentioned above, temporary contracts 
incentives the no-sensation of security in a job.    
Concerning the education level, in Denmark, people with college studies feel more 
insecure in a job place. This group of people already showed less preference for job 
security than the rest, but now, the difference with the sensation from medium level 
education group is not as significant as it was in the previous model. The feeling of 
those with low levels of education is lower to the feeling of people with medium level 
education even if desired it the most. In Spain, people with low levels of education were 
the ones who felt more secure on their job place. As in Denmark, people with higher 
levels of education had the lowest feeling of job security. It is remarkable that only the 
coefficient of the high education level from Denmark is significant. Regarding the 
perception of job security related to the employment situation, in both countries full 
time employees have a higher perception of job security, but is in Spain where the 
difference between full-time and part-time employees’ perception is bigger, actually, the 
difference is 4 times bigger. These results conduct me to say that the Spanish labour 
market regulation provides a polarised sensation of job security, while in Denmark, the 
job protection feeling is shared almost equally. 
The last variable analysed is the union membership. In Spain, where the union 
membership is low, the difference between the job security perception between those 
who are union members and those who are not is not significant; in fact, those who are 
not union member feel more secure. This means that being member of a union in Spain 
has no advantage in terms of job security perception. However, in Denmark, the 
difference on job security between those who are union members are those who are not 
is 0.09. The positive effect of being member of a union in Denmark could explain the 
high rates of pertinence to a union. 
4.4 Including country dummy variable 
In the next section, a dummy variable will be included on the previous econometric 
model. This new variable is called DENMARK and takes value 1 when the respondent is 
Danes. The purpose to include this variable is to see if it exist a significant difference 
between the preferences and the feeling for job security between Denmark and Spain. 
The econometric model used is as follows:   
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Model 5, estimation of V11 variable 
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Table 10 and table 11 represent the results from the estimation of model 5 and 6. The 
key factor of these two models is the coefficient of the dummy variable DENMARK. 
This coefficient reveals who prefers job security and who feel more secure on its job 
place respectively for the regression of V11 and V29. The results are significant enough 
to affirm that despite the fact that Spaniard prefer job security more than Danes, are 
Danish people who do feel more secure in their jobs. The main difference between 
Spanish and Danish opinion is concerning the preferences for job security. That 
difference is 0.712. This result can be linked with the previous analysis, in Spain the job 
security is valued by every kind of person, and job security is highly valued for Spanish 
employed and unemployed people. In Denmark, even if job security is valued, it is not 
as sought as in Spain, people may prefer other aspects in a job rather than job security. 
The output of the model where the variable V29 is explained revels that the labour 
market which employees find the highest level of job security is the Danish one. In this 
case, the difference between the feeling of job security of Spanish and Danish people is 
not as big and significant as the difference previously analysed. The coefficient for the 
dummy variable DENMAK is 0.23 and it is significant at 5% level. 
The results indicate that when someone feels secure on a job place, their preferences for 
job security are lower, and other characteristics are valued. Being on a labour market 
that gives high levels of job security allows seeking for employments with other 
characteristics that will contribute to have a more satisfying job. As figure 26 reveals, 
Danish wage earners workers are experiencing the greatest degree of job satisfaction in 
the EU. 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The results obtained in the analysis of the job security preferences and feeling guide us 
to believe that both of them depend on the labour market organization. The structure of 
the labour market is essential to determine the employment and unemployment rate, 
satisfaction of a job place and also influences on the preferences for flexibility. 
It has been shown in the project that the flexicurity Danish labour market is based on 
three essential elements, which are high levels of flexibility, generous unemployment 
benefits, and efficient, wide active labour market policies (ALMP). On the other hand, 
the Spanish labour market is characterized by high levels of employment protection 
regulations; the unemployment benefits have a medium degree of generosity compared 
with other European models and it is based, mainly, on passive labour market policies 
(PLMP). 
In Denmark, despite the employment protection regulations are low; the feeling of 
security on a job place is more elevated than in Spain where the employment protection 
regulations are higher. The regulatory framework existing in the Spanish labour market 
does not give the impression of protection to employees. Moreover, the external 
inflexibility existing in the labour market complicates the creation of new jobs. In 
Denmark the whole labour market system contributes to generate a high level of job 
security feeling. The generous unemployment benefits and the efficient ALMP 
contribute to generate a quick return to employment, which raises the security sensation. 
The fact of job security perception permits to seek for job opportunities where job 
security is not provided by the employer. There are other characteristics that will make 
the job satisfaction higher and, consequently, the results will be better. 
The perception of job security is not a matter of employment protection regulation; it 
involves the whole labour market framework. The bad outcome of the Spanish labour 
market needs a reform. But if we want to preserve the welfare state, it is a non-sense to 
promote a third labour reform, aiming to make the Spanish labour market more flexible, 
without modifying the labour market policies and without enhancing the unemployment 
benefits. 
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
Figure 1: Average tenure with the same employer in a number of OECD countries, 
2000, 2007 and 2014. 
Source: OECD 
Figure 2: Percentage of partial-time jobs over the total in 2000 Q4, 2007 Q4 and 2015 
Q3 
    
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 3: Working time distribution of employees by gender in Hungary, United 
Kingdom, France and Denmark 2004 
 
 
 
NB: Figures are based on hours usually worked in the main job, overtime not included. 
Source: Flexible working time arrangements and gender equality 
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NB: Figures are based on hours usually worked in the main job, overtime not included. 
 
Source: Flexible working time arrangements and gender equality 
 
 
Figure 4 Variation of the average annual wages for Denmark, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom and Spain 
 
 
Source: OCDE 
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Figure 5 Numerical, functional and wage flexibility 2003 
Source: Eichhrst, Marx and Trobsch (2009). 
 
Figure 6 Internal, external and wage flexibility, 2003 
 
Source: Eichhrst, Marx and Trobsch (2009). 
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Figure 7: GDP annual growth rate for Spain and Denmark, 2003-2014 
 
Source: World Bank 
Figure 8: Annual employment rate for Denmark, Spain, EU 15 Countries and EU 27 
Countries 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 9: Annual unemployment rate for Denmark, Spain, EU 15 Countries and EU 27 
Countries 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure 10: The Danish flexicurity model 
Source:  EC (2006), figure 1, page 79. 
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Figure 11 Expenditure on ALMP and LPMP as a percentage of the GDP, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat Note: Active measures include training, labour market services, 
employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation 
and start-up incentives. Passive measures include Out-of-work income maintenance and 
support. 
Figure 12: Expenditure in € on ALMP and PLMP by unemployed, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and own elaboration  
Note: Active measures include training, labour market services, employment incentives, 
supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives. 
Passive measures include Out-of-work income maintenance and support. 
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Figure 13: Average job tenure in EU-15in 2008 
Source: OECD 
Figure 14: Index of employment protection in a number of OECD countries, 2013 
 Source: OECD 
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Figure 15: Preferences for job security per group age  
 
Proportion of people who consider job security as very important  
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
Figure 16: Preferences for job security per level of education and sex 
 
Proportion of people who consider job security as very important or important  
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
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Figure 17: Preferences for job security & job situation 
 
Proportion of people who consider job security as very important or important  
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
Figure 18: Preferences for job security & job situation 
 
Proportion of people who consider job security as very important 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
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Figure 19: Preferences for job security and union membership 
 
Proportion of people who consider job security as very important 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
Figure 20: Percentage of people who consider job security as very important and feeling 
of job security 
 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
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Figure 21: V11 in relation to AGE, observed and estimated, Denmark 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
Figure 22: V11 in relation to AGE, Observed and estimated, Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
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Figure 23: V29 in relation to AGE, observed and estimated, Denmark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
Figure 24: V29 in relation to AGE, observed and estimated, Spain 
 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
 5
 20  30  40  50  60  70
V
2
9
_
AGE
estimada
observada
46 
 
Figure 25: Temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees, by 
sex and age in 2005 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure 26: Job satisfaction, percentage of people who are satisfied or very satisfied with 
their jobs in EU-15 countries 
 
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(2010) 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES 
Table 2: Unemployment insurance benefits 2010 EU 15 Countries; 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm 
 
  Unemployment insurance benefits, 2010 
For a 40-year old (where benefits are conditional on work history, the table assumes a long and uninterrupted 
employment record) 
  Employment (E) and  
contribution (C) 
conditions 
Maximum  
duration  
(months) 
Payment rate (% of earnings base) 
Earnings base(2) 
  
initial at end of legal 
entitlement period 
EU-15 Countries           
Austria E+C: 1 year in 2. 9 55   Net 
Belgium E+C: 468 days in  
27 months. 
Unlimited 60  53.8 (after  
1 year) 
Gross 
Denmark E: 52 weeks in 3 years. 
C: membership fee. 
24 90   Gross less 8% 
SSC. 
Finland E: 34 weeks in 28 
months, 
C: 10 months. 
23 Basic benefit 
(16.8% of AW) 
plus 45% of 
earnings 
exceeding basic 
benefit to 82% 
of AW then 
20%. 
  Gross (excluding 
additional holiday 
pay) less SSC. 
France C: 4 months in 28 
months. 
24 57-75   Gross 
Germany E: 12 months, 
C: 12 months in 2 years. 
12 60   Net 
Greece E+C: 125 days in 14 
months or 200 days in  
2 years. 
12 Flat rate benefit 
(27.1% of AW). 
  -- 
Ireland(5) C: 39 weeks in 1 year  
(or 26 "reckonable" 
contributions in 2 years). 
104 weeks contributions 
paid since starting work  
12 Fixed amount  
(31.5% of AW). 
  -- 
Italy(6) C: 52 weeks in 2 years. 8 60 50 after 6 months  Average gross 
earnings of last 
3 months. 
Luxembourg E+C: 26 weeks in  
1 year. 
12 80   Average gross 
earnings of last 
3 months. 
Netherlands E+C: 26 weeks in 36, 
plus 52 days in 4 of  
5 years. 
22 75  70 (after 2 months) Gross 
Portugal E+C: 450 days in  
24 months. 
24 65   Gross 
Spain C: 360 days in 6 years. 24 70 60 (after 6 months) Gross 
Sweden E: 6 months in last 
year,  
C: been a member of an 
insurance fund for 12 
months. 
35 80 70 (after 9 months). 
65 for Job and 
Development 
Guarantee 
(after 14 months). 
Gross 
United Kingdom C: 12 months in  2 
years. 
6 Fixed amount 
(9.9% of AW). 
  -- 
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Table 3: Summary of the questions, answers given and the aggrupation made 
 
Question Original Answers Matched answers 
G
ro
u
p
 1
 
Sex of respondent  
Male  Male 
Female Female 
Marital status of 
respondent 
Married, living as married Married 
Widowed 
Single 
Single, never married 
Separated, but married 
Divorced 
Divorced 
Education level 
No formal qualification, none, still at 
school 
Low education level 
Lowest formal qualification attainable 
Intermediary secondary completed 
Higher secondary completed 
Medium Education level Qualifications which are above the 
higher secondary level, but below a full 
university degree; other education 
University degree completed High education level 
Current 
employment 
status 
Employed-full time Full-time job 
Employed-part time 
Part-time job Employed less than part-time 
Helping family member 
Unemployed Unemployed 
Student, at school, vocational training 
Inactive 
Retired 
Housewife, -man, home duties 
Permanently disabled 
Other, not in labour force 
Is respondent 
member of a 
trade union? 
Currently member Union member 
Once member, not now Not Union member  
Never member Never member 
Not in labour force Missing 
G
ro
u
p
 2
 
V11 Personally 
important: job 
security 
Very important 
Important 
Important 
Neither important nor unimportant Neither important nor unimportant 
Not important 
Not important 
Not important at all 
V29 Personally 
agree: My job is 
secure 
Not applicable Missing 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 and own elaboration 
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Table 4: Sample description 
Spain Denamrk Total 
Observations % Observations % Observations % 
Respondents 1203 42,95% 1598 57,05% 2801 100% 
SEX 
Male 581 48,30% 757 47,37% 1338 47,77% 
Female 622 51,70% 841 52,63% 1463 52,23% 
Total 1203 100% 1598 100% 2801 100% 
Average age 
Average 45 47 46 
Standard 
deviation 
17,9722 14,6389 16,167 
Labour 
status 
Full time 496 41,23% 1004 62,83% 1500 53,55% 
Part-time 76 6,32% 137 8,57% 213 7,60% 
Unemployed 103 8,56% 36 2,25% 139 4,96% 
Inactive 528 43,89% 389 24,34% 917 32,74% 
Missing 0 0,00% 32 2,00% 32 1,14% 
Total 1203 100,00% 1598 100,00% 2801 100,00% 
Education 
level 
Low 934 77,64% 202 12,64% 1136 40,56% 
Medium 166 13,80% 1092 68,34% 1258 44,91% 
High 96 7,98% 222 13,89% 318 11,35% 
Missing 7 0,58% 82 5,13% 89 3,18% 
Total 1203 100,00% 1598 100,00% 2801 100,00% 
Marital 
Status 
Married 721 59,93% 984 61,58% 1705 60,87% 
Single 424 35,25% 448 28,04% 872 31,13% 
Divorced 56 4,66% 152 9,51% 208 7,43% 
Missing 2 0,17% 14 0,88% 16 0,57% 
Total 1203 100,00% 1598 100,00% 2801 100,00% 
Union 
membership 
Member 84 6,98% 1156 72,34% 1240 44,27% 
No longer 
member 
115 9,56% 256 16,02% 371 13,25% 
Never member 961 79,88% 167 10,45% 1128 40,27% 
Missing 43 3,57% 19 1,19% 62 2,21% 
Total 1203 100,00% 1598 100,00% 2801 100,00% 
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V11 
Agree 1164 96,76% 1261 78,91% 2425 86,58% 
Indiferent 14 1,16% 155 9,70% 169 6,03% 
Disagree 16 1,33% 134 8,39% 150 5,36% 
Missing 9 0,75% 48 3,00% 57 2,03% 
Total 1203 100,00% 1598 100,00% 2801 100,00% 
V29 
Agree 388 32,25% 892 55,82% 1280 45,70% 
Indiferent 71 5,90% 151 9,45% 222 7,93% 
Disagree 106 8,81% 165 10,33% 271 9,68% 
Missing 638 53,03% 390 24,41% 1028 36,70% 
Total 1203 100,00% 1598 100,00% 2801 100,00% 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
Table 5: Preferences and perception of job security 
  
Very 
important 
Important Indifferent 
Not 
important 
Not 
important at 
all 
Denmark 
Very secure 38,00% 45,30% 8,77% 6,68% 1,25% 
Secure 26,87% 56,97% 7,96% 7,21% 1,00% 
Indifferent 20,95% 51,35% 18,24% 8,11% 1,35% 
Not Secure 25,00% 45,83% 13,54% 14,58% 1,04% 
Not secure at all 29,23% 33,85% 18,46% 15,38% 3,08% 
Spain 
Very secure 84,18% 14,56% 0,63% 0,63% 0,00% 
Secure 67,83% 30,87% 0,43% 0,87% 0,00% 
Indifferent 63,38% 30,99% 0,00% 5,63% 0,00% 
Not Secure 63,16% 31,58% 3,95% 1,32% 0,00% 
Not secure at all 70,00% 16,67% 0,00% 10,00% 3,33% 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005 
  
51 
 
Table 6: Model 1, OLS, using observations 1-1598 (n = 1444) 
The incomplete and missing variables have been omitted: 154 
Dependent variable: V11 Preferences for job security 
Country: Denmark 
Robust standard errors against heteroscedasticity, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Stand. Desv.  t-statistict P-Value  
const 4.09 0.31 13.31 <0.00001 *** 
AGE −0.01 0.01 -0.31 0.75552  
sq_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.42947  
MALE −0.20 0.04 -4.11 0.00004 *** 
SINGLE 0.01 0.06 0.21 0.83013  
DIVORCED 0.11 0.07 1.58 0.11390  
DEGREE_LOW 0.11 0.07 1.44 0.14950  
DEGREE_HIGH −0.28 0.06 -4.13 0.00004 *** 
FULL-TIME −0.14 0.12 -1.05 0.29262  
PART-TIME −0.17 0.15 -1.12 0.26179  
INACTIVE 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.98299  
Union_Member 0.15 0.07 2.18 0.02946 ** 
Union_Never −0.19 0.10 -1.78 0.07519 * 
 
R-squared  0.06  Corrected R-squared  0.06 
F(12, 1431)  8.45  P-Value (F)  1.17e-15 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% 
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Table 7: Model 2, OLS, using observations 1-1203 (n = 1149) 
The incomplete and missing variables have been omitted: 54 
Dependent variable: V11 
Country: Spain 
Robust standard errors against heteroscedasticity, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Stand. Desv.  t-statistict P-Value  
const 4.51 0.19 23.47 <0.00001 *** 
AGE −0.01 0.01 -0.39 0.69472  
sq_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.84562  
MALE −0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.88638  
SINGLE −0.04 0.04 -0.90 0.36345  
DIVORCED −0.08 0.10 -0.78 0.42978  
DEGREE_LOW 0.02 0.05 0.38 0.69944  
DEGREE_HIGH −0.07 0.07 -0.83 0.40471  
FULL-TIME 0.08 0.07 1.02 0.30551  
PART-TIME −0.04 0.11 -0.37 0.70718  
INACTIVE 0.09 0.07 1.13 0.25514  
Union_Member 0.23 0.09 2.50 0.01231 ** 
Union_Never 0.19 0.07 2.41 0.01575 ** 
 
R-squared  0.02  Corrected R-squared  0.01 
F(12, 1136)  1.27  P-Value (F)  0.23 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% 
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Table 8: Model 3, OLS, using observations 1-1598 (n = 1129) 
The incomplete and missing variables have been omitted: 469 
Dependent variable: V29 Perception of job security 
Country: Denmark 
Robust standard errors against heteroscedasticity, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Stand. Desv.  t-statistict P-Value  
const 5.23 0.49 10.64 <0.00001 *** 
AGE −0.07 0.02 -2.90 0.00375 *** 
sq_AGE 0.00 0.00 2.96 0.00311 *** 
MALE 0.04 0.07 0.59 0.54905  
SINGLE −0.16 0.10 -1.65 0.09907 * 
DIVORCED −0.20 0.13 -1.55 0.12044  
DEGREE_LOW −0.06 0.13 -0.48 0.63055  
DEGREE_HIGH −0.16 0.09 -1.71 0.08746 * 
FULL-TIME 0.11 0.11 0.97 0.33330  
Union_Member 0.11 0.12 0.94 0.34598  
Union_Never 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.92023  
 
R-squared  0.01  Corrected R-squared  0.01 
F(10, 1118)  1.61  P-Value (F)  0.10 
 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%   
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Table 9: Model 4, OLS, using observations 1-1203 (n = 540) 
The incomplete and missing variables have been omitted: 663 
Dependent variable: V29 
Country: Spain 
Robust standard errors against heteroscedasticity, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Stand. Desv.  t-statistict P-Value  
const 1.29 0.70 1.84 0.06642 * 
AGE 0.08 0.03 2.56 0.01070 ** 
sq_AGE −0.00 0.01 -2.18 0.02906 ** 
MALE −0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.99242  
SINGLE −0.11 0.12 -0.91 0.36220  
DIVORCED −0.44 0.22 -2.00 0.04587 ** 
DEGREE_LOW 0.11 0.14 0.79 0.42809  
DEGREE_HIGH −0.04 0.20 -0.23 0.81763  
FULL-TIME 0.43 0.17 2.41 0.01601 ** 
Union_Member 0.25 0.21 1.16 0.24523  
Union_Never 0.26 0.18 1.47 0.14172  
 
R-squared  0.07  Corrected R-squared  0.05 
F(10, 529)  3.55  P-Value (F)  0.00 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% 
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Table 10: Model 5, OLS, using observations 1-2801 (n = 2593) 
The incomplete and missing variables have been omitted: 208 
Dependent variable: V11 
Robust standard errors against heteroscedasticity, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Stand. Desv.  t-statistict P-Value  
const 4.75 0.16 29.34 <0.00001 *** 
AGE −0.01 0.01 -0.61 0.53976  
sq_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.33834  
MALE −0.11 0.03 -3.44 0.00059 *** 
SINGLE −0.02 0.04 -0.38 0.70156  
DIVORCED 0.07 0.06 1.12 0.26343  
DEGREE_LOW 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.75130  
DEGREE_HIGH −0.24 0.05 -4.30 0.00002 *** 
FULL TIME −0.04 0.04 -1.00 0.31833  
Union_Member 0.17 0.06 3.04 0.00241 *** 
Union_Never −0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.91997  
Denmark −0.71 0.06 -12.73 <0.00001 *** 
 
R-squared  0.16  Corrected R-squared  0.16 
F(11, 1657)  47.23  P-Value (F)  1.01e-94 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% 
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Table 11: Model 6, OLS, using observations 1-2801 (n = 1669) 
The incomplete and missing variables have been omitted: 1132 
Dependent variable: V29 
Robust standard errors against heteroscedasticity, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Stand. Desv.  t-statistict P-Value  
const 3.72 0.42 8.85 <0.00001 *** 
AGE −0.01 0.02 -0.62 0.53399  
sq_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.42726  
MALE 0.04 0.06 0.73 0.46443  
SINGLE −0.14 0.08 -1.83 0.06606 * 
DIVORCED −0.28 0.11 -2.54 0.01112 ** 
DEGREE_LOW 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.97070  
DEGREE_HIGH −0.14 0.08 -1.66 0.09675 * 
FULL TIME 0.15 0.09 1.60 0.10868  
Union_Member 0.12 0.10 1.12 0.25990  
Union_Never 0.13 0.11 1.10 0.27016  
Denmark 0.23 0.10 2.20 0.02762 ** 
 
R-squared  0.02  Corrected R-squared  0.02 
F(11, 1657)  3.14  P-Value (F)  0.00 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% 
 
 
